In the Stanley Mosk Courthouse, a Los Angeles Superior Court Judge openly refused to provide jurors with the standard civil jury instruction informing them of their right to request testimony readback during deliberations — a statutory right guaranteed under California law.
During the jury instruction conference in a civil jury trial currently in deliberations, Judge Cochran stated on the record:
“I’m not going to give jury instruction 508, having a court reporter read back testimony. It’s hard to find the court reporter, chase her down, get her in here, going through the testimony to pick out what they want, and then all that. It just takes time. Do you know where I got that?”
The courtroom clerk replied, “Your predecessor.”
This refusal to give the readback instruction is legally significant, raising both procedural and constitutional concerns. It highlights a growing and troubling pattern in California civil courts: judges treating mandatory readback procedures as discretionary administrative inconveniences, rather than statutory obligations that protect the integrity of jury deliberations.
The Law is CCP § 614 and the Jury’s Right to Readback
Under California Code of Civil Procedure § 614, juries in civil cases have the right to request readback of testimony if they disagree or are uncertain about what a witness said. The statute provides:
“After the jury have retired for deliberation, if there be any disagreement between them as to the testimony, or if they desire to be informed on any point of law arising in the case, they must require the officer to conduct them into court. Upon being brought into court, the information required must be given in the presence of or after notice to the parties or counsel.”
This language is not discretionary. When jurors make a proper request, the court must bring them back into open court and provide the information they request — including readback by the official court reporter. Judges do not have the authority to refuse such a request because it is “inconvenient” or “time-consuming.”
Despite this clear statutory mandate, Judge Cochran went a step further and misinformed the jury about their rights under CCP § 614. Addressing the panel directly, he stated:
This statement is flatly contrary to California law. Jurors do, in fact, have the right to request readback, regardless of the length of the trial. By telling them “we don’t do that,” the court not only declined to give the required instruction, but affirmatively misled the jury about a statutory right, potentially tainting deliberations and creating a strong appellate issue, if any disagreement over testimony arises.
📘 The Instruction is CACI No. 5008
To ensure jurors understand this right, the Judicial Council of California adopted CACI No. 5008 – Disagreement About Testimony. The instruction states:
“If you disagree about the testimony, you may ask that the court reporter read to you the relevant parts of the testimony. You may also ask to be informed on any point of law.”
This is a standard instruction given before deliberations in civil jury trials. Its omission is rare — and potentially prejudicial — because it leaves jurors unaware of a key procedural safeguard designed to resolve disputes about evidence accurately.
Case Law Says it’s a Mandatory Duty, Not Discretion
Although most appellate case law on jury readbacks arises in the criminal context, the principles apply equally in civil trials because CCP § 614 governs both. California appellate courts have consistently held that failure to honor a jury’s request for readback constitutes error:
- People v. Butler (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 273 — The Court of Appeal reversed a conviction where the trial court refused a jury’s request for testimony readback, emphasizing that the statutory duty under Penal Code § 1138 (the criminal analogue of CCP § 614) is mandatory.
- People v. Gurule (2002) 28 Cal.4th 557, 649 — The California Supreme Court reiterated that a court “must provide the jury with the requested information,” including readback, and that failure to do so is error.
The same language — “must” — appears in CCP § 614. In civil trials, courts have treated refusal to provide requested information or readback as reversible error where prejudice can be shown, because such refusals impair the jury’s ability to deliberate accurately and fairly.
Readback Matters Because of Accuracy and Deliberative Integrity
Juries are tasked with resolving disputes about facts based on witness testimony. Over the course of a multi-day or multi-week civil trial, jurors may hear dozens of witnesses and hundreds of exhibits. It is neither realistic nor legally sound to expect perfect recall of every detail.
Readback ensures that when jurors disagree or are uncertain, they can rely on the official verbatim record rather than memory, conjecture, or persuasion by the loudest voice in the room. This safeguard:
- Reduces the risk of deliberative error,
- Protects the parties’ due process rights, and
- Reinforces the role of the court reporter as the guardian of the record.
By refusing to give CACI 5008, Judge Cochran effectively withheld from the jury the knowledge that this safeguard exists.
Structural Breakdown – Reporter Continuity Lost
A significant factor underlying this breakdown is the loss of reporter continuity in civil trials. Traditionally, official court reporters — or seasoned freelancers who treated trials as a single, continuous assignment — remained with the case from voir dire through verdict, ensuring they were present and fully familiar with the record during deliberations. By contrast, the growing reliance on agency-booked pro tem reporters, who often cover trials on a piecemeal basis, has fractured this chain of custody. Reporters rotate in and out, don’t communicate with each other, and are frequently “out of the loop” once their day or portion is finished. This lack of coordination leaves judges scrambling to locate whichever reporter happened to cover the relevant witness, or their transcripts, at precisely the moment the jury requests readback. Reporters who maintain full-trial continuity, by contrast, routinely stay through deliberations or hand off certified transcripts to a designated colleague — practices that eliminate these logistical gaps. The problem isn’t with the concept of readback; it’s with a staffing model that treats trials like interchangeable calendar slots rather than unified proceedings.
Judicial Convenience vs. Legal Duty
Judge Cochran’s stated reason for refusing the instruction — that it’s “hard to find the court reporter, chase her down, get her in here… it just takes time” — reveals a judicial culture problem. In busy civil courts like Stanley Mosk, efficiency pressures are real. But administrative inconvenience is not a lawful basis for denying jurors a statutory right.
The judge’s remark also implicitly frames the reporter’s role as peripheral — a logistical burden rather than an essential officer of the court. In reality, the ability to perform readback is one of the clearest examples of why live, licensed court reporters remain indispensable in California’s legal system.
Unlike AI transcripts or uncertified recordings, reporters can instantly locate, certify, and read back testimony with legal accuracy and reliability, ensuring the jury receives the exact words spoken in court.
Systemic Pattern – Erosion of Safeguards
This morning’s incident is not an isolated event. Across California, particularly in high-volume civil courts, there has been a quiet erosion of procedural safeguards as courts adapt to resource constraints, shortages of reporters, and increasing pressure to move cases quickly.
This erosion often takes the form of:
- Judges discouraging or refusing readbacks;
- Substituting uncertified digital recordings for official transcripts;
- Skipping or modifying standard instructions; and
- Framing reporters as “optional” or “inconvenient” rather than essential.
These practices may seem minor in the moment but have major implications on appeal. When a verdict is challenged, appellate courts look to whether the jury was properly instructed and had access to accurate information during deliberations. A judge’s refusal to give a mandated instruction — especially one tied to a statutory right — is a glaring red flag.
Potential Appellate Implications
If a party in this case were to lose at trial and challenge the outcome, Judge Cochran’s refusal could form the basis of an appellate argument that:
- The court failed to instruct the jury on a material legal right (CACI 5008 / CCP § 614);
- This omission misled the jury about their procedural options during deliberations; and
- The omission resulted in prejudice, particularly if the jury later disagreed on testimony but did not realize they could request readback.
Appellate courts apply a harmless error analysis to jury instruction errors. However, where a statutory right is involved and the error may have influenced deliberations, reversal is possible.
Moreover, this kind of error is entirely avoidable. The instruction is standard. The procedure is clear. The reporter is present. The only barrier in this case was judicial will.
Broader Context – The Reporter’s Role and Judicial Accountability
This shift isn’t just a logistical inconvenience — it’s a further step toward removing court reporters from the judicial process altogether. By fragmenting trial coverage among rotating freelancers and agency contractors, the courts are normalizing a system where the reporter is no longer treated as a central officer of the court but as a disposable, interchangeable service provider. When judges grow accustomed to not knowing who the reporter is, or whether a reporter can be located for readback, it becomes easier to justify technological “solutions” like digital recording or AI transcription in the name of efficiency. What begins as administrative disorganization quickly becomes a pretext for permanent structural change — sidelining human reporters and eroding the safeguards they provide.
Stripping court reporters from the trial process isn’t just an industry issue — it’s a constitutional one. Court reporters are not mere transcriptionists; they are independent officers of the court, ensuring that every word uttered in a courtroom is preserved faithfully and subject to judicial oversight. When that safeguard is eroded — whether through administrative neglect, outsourcing to agencies, or replacing reporters with machines — the accuracy and accountability of the record are compromised. History shows that removing independent oversight from judicial proceedings is a dangerous step toward tyranny. Without a verifiable, contemporaneous record, power consolidates in the hands of those who control the narrative after the fact — not those who speak truth in real time. This is why the reporter’s role is not ornamental; it is structural to the rule of law.
Conclusion
Judge Steve Cochran’s refusal to give the jury the standard readback instruction is more than an offhand administrative decision. It is a legal error with significant implications, both for the parties in the case and for the broader integrity of California’s civil justice system.
By declining to inform jurors of their statutory right under CCP § 614, the court potentially undermined their ability to deliberate accurately and fairly. By framing reporter readback as a logistical inconvenience, it signaled a troubling cultural shift away from procedural fidelity and toward expediency.
The law is clear. The instruction is standard. The reporter is present. The right belongs to the jury.
StenoImperium
Court Reporting. Unfiltered. Unafraid.
Disclaimer
This article reflects my perspective and analysis as a court reporter and eyewitness. It is not legal advice, nor is it intended to substitute for the advice of an attorney.
This article includes analysis and commentary based on observed events, public records, and legal statutes.
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